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A "HEARTLESS" DECISION:
WHY PRE-MARKET APPROVAL DOES NOT
PREEMPT ALL STATE TORT CLAIMS
AGAINST MEDICAL DEVICE
MANUFACTURERS
LISA BUTLERt

INTRODUCTION

Imagine that you urgently need a life-saving medical device.
What questions would you ask your physician? Would you want
to know what your available options are? Would you ask if the
model that your doctor selected has ever been reported to fail?
Would you ask how thoroughly the Food and Drug
Administration ("FDA") investigated the selected device before
approving it for sale in the United States? Most Americans are
unaware of the importance of asking any or all of these
questions.1 Most of us would simply trust the choice of our
physician, believing that he or she is sufficiently informed about
the device's safety profile to make the best choice. 2 In addition,
most Americans assume that the FDA would not permit a
manufacturer to market a device that was unsafe or negligently
designed. 3 However, like any other administrative agency, the
FDA has limited financial and human resources. Sometimes,
despite the most thorough evaluation possible, a device poses

t J.D. Candidate, June 2006, St. John's University School of Law; B.A., 1999, St.
John's University College of Pharmacy and Allied Health Professions.
1 See Roger W. Bivans, Substantially Equivalent? Federal Preemption of State
Common-Law Claims Involving Medical Devices, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1087, 1087 (1996).
2 See id.
3 See United States v. Chatterji, 46 F.3d 1336, 1344 (4th Cir. 1995)
(Murnaghan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the public relies on FDA approval to feel
safe when taking medications); Bivans, supra note 1, at 1087 (asserting that
patients do not question the quality of medical devices given that the federal
government tests these products for safety).
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risks that were not evident during the FDA approval process. 4
Tragically, those risks can result in serious injury or even death
to the patient.
Imagine further that because of a defect undetected by both
the manufacturer and the FDA you have been seriously injured
by the very device that was meant to restore your health. Yet,
you are told that you have no recourse in the American legal
system because the FDA's approval of the device bars your claims
against the manufacturer via the legal doctrine of preemption.
This is precisely what happened in the recent Third Circuit case,
5
Horn v. Thoratec Corp.
In January 1998, Daniel Horn suffered a heart attack. 6 A
week later, a medical device, known as the HeartMate, was
implanted into his body to aid blood circulation through his
heart.7 Because of a defect in the device, air entered the closed
system and an air embolus traveled to Mr. Horn's brain,
ultimately causing his death. 8 Mrs. Horn, as executor of Mr.
Horn's estate, brought common law tort claims against the
manufacturer in the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Pennsylvania. 9 The district court dismissed the case,
finding Mrs. Horn's state claims preempted because they would
impose requirements on the manufacturer that were different
from, or in addition to, the requirements imposed by the FDA's

4 See Kemp v. Medtronic, Inc., 231 F.3d 216, 236-37 (6th Cir. 2000) (discussing
the plaintiffs potential claim for breach of the manufacturer's duty to warn of risks
discovered subsequent to FDA approval of a device); see also Stupak v. Hoffman-La
Roche, Inc., 287 F. Supp. 2d 968, 974-75 (E.D. Wis. 2003) (accepting plaintiffs
causation argument based on an acne drug manufacturer's failure to warn of risk of
suicidal ideation where risk became evident after FDA approval of the drug); Enlow
v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 684, 691 (W.D. Ky. 2001) (stating that
warnings about risks first identified after the FDA has granted pre-market approval
of a medical device still require FDA approval); Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 683
F. Supp. 1579, 1580 (D. Minn. 1988) (noting that the FDA regulation requiring a
warning about the risk of pelvic inflammatory disease associated with defendant
manufacturer's medical device was not enacted until after FDA approval of the
device).
5 376 F.3d 163 (3d Cir. 2004).
6 Id. at 165.
7 Id.
8 See id.
9 See id. (stating that the complaint alleged claims for defective design and
manufacture of the HeartMate and failure to warn of the device's alleged defects).
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approval process. 10 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling.11
This Comment proposes that the Third Circuit was too hasty
in finding that Mrs. Horn's state tort claims were preempted by
the Medical Device Amendments to the Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act ('MDA"). Part I will explain the background of the MDA and
the preemption defense, and will describe the Horn decision.
Part II will demonstrate that the presumption against
preemption, as informed by the legislative intent and the
statutory structure of the MDA, supports the conclusion that
Mrs. Horn's state tort claims should not have been deemed
preempted. Part III will discuss the importance of the FDA's
view of preemption and will show that FDA regulations require a
court to evaluate a plaintiffs tort claims individually before
finding preemption. Part IV will illustrate that the Horn court
did not adequately evaluate the nature of each of Mrs. Horn's
tort claims to determine whether they would impose
requirements different from or in addition to those imposed by
the FDA. Finally, a more exhaustive analysis of Mrs. Horn's
claims will show that some-but not necessarily all--of the
claims should have survived preemption.

I. MDA PREEMPTION OF STATE CLAIMS IN HORN V. THORATEC
A. Background of the Preemption Defense and the Medical Device
Amendments
The American tort system has two major functions. First, it
is a "vehicle of legal redress" for victims who have been injured at
the hands of another. 12 Second, it deters wrongful or negligent
conduct with the threat of large damage awards. 13 Within this
system, every manufacturer is under a common law duty to use
due care to avoid foreseeable dangers in the products that it
sells. 14
However, where the product at issue is federally
10 See id.

11 Id. at 164.
12 VINCENT R. JOHNSON

& ALAN

GUNN, STUDIES IN AMERICAN TORT LAW 3

(3d ed. 2005). There is a strong public interest in providing a means for accident
victims to obtain compensation for their injuries from the party responsible for the
harm. See id. at 9.
13 See DeLoach v. Alfred, 960 P.2d 628, 632 (Ariz. 1998) (en banc) (stating that
tort liability is a powerful tool in deterring future dangerous behavior).
14 See Michael Weinberger, Federal Preemption and Product Liability, N.Y. L.J.,
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regulated, manufacturers often argue that state common law tort
15
claims must be preempted by the federal regulation.
Preemption is the doctrine under which federal law
supersedes state law by operation of the Supremacy Clause of
Article VI of the United States Constitution. 16 When a court
upholds the preemption defense in a products liability
controversy, the injured party is often left with no legal
recourse. 17 Therefore, it is imperative that a court evaluate
Congress' intended scope of preemption, 8 each of the plaintiffs
claims, and the applicable federal requirement before deciding
that a conflict exists.
Congress enacted the MDA in 1976 in response to injuries
caused by a contraceptive device known as the Dalkon Shield.' 9
With new, more complicated devices entering the market,
Congress sought to protect the public health by "assur[ing] the
reasonable safety and effectiveness of medical devices intended
for human use."20 Although Congress also noted its intention to
encourage the development of new medical devices by instituting
a uniform regulatory scheme, commentators have recognized that

Apr. 18, 1997, at 1 (discussing the general requirement that every manufacturer
exercise reasonable care in designing and manufacturing a product); see also
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 501 (1996) (describing the general duties of
manufacturers).
15 The defense of preemption asserts that an act of Congress expressly or
impliedly preempts any and all requirements that conflict with requirements placed
on the product by a federal agency or enactment. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group,
Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) ("[I]t has been settled that state law that conflicts with
federal law is 'without effect.'" (quoting Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746
(1981))); Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383 (1992).
16 See KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 324
(15th ed. 2004); see also U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("[T]he Laws of the United
States ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.").
17 See Betsy J. Grey, Make Congress Speak Clearly: FederalPreemption of State
Tort Remedies, 77 B.U. L. REV. 559, 562 (1997).
18 See id. at 566-69 (explaining that the Supreme Court's preemption analysis
requires either a "clear statement" of congressional intent to preempt, or implied
preemption due to the impossibility of complying with both state and federal law).
19 Id. at 583. The Dalkon Shield caused many serious injuries during the 1960s
and early 1970s, including deaths, infections, infertility, and inadvertent
preganancies. See Id.; David C. Vladeck, FederalPreemption of State Tort Law: The
Problem of MedicalDrugs and Devices, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 95, 103 (2005).
20 Grey, supra note 17, at 583 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1090, at 51 (1976)
(Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1070, 1103).
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the chief goal of the MDA was the protection of public health. 2 1
Section 360k(a) of the MDA explicitly preempts any
requirement established by a state or political subdivision "with
respect to" a medical device, "which is different from, or in
addition to, any [federal] requirement applicable under [the
statute] to the device." 22 Congress' use of the word "requirement"
as it refers to state action has been a source of fierce litigation
and debate. 23 The central issue of the debate is whether
Congress intended state "requirements" to include only state
legislative and administrative enactments or to encompass state
24
common law tort remedies as well.
In addition, courts have diverged about how specific to a
particular device the state and/or federal requirements must be
21 See Anne-Marie Dega, The Battle over Medical Device Regulation: Do the
Federal Medical Device Amendments Preempt State Tort Law Claims?, 27 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 615, 624-25 (1996).
22 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a)(1) (2000).
23 A split remains among the United States circuit courts over whether the
MDA preempts state tort claims. Before the Third Circuit decision in Horn v.
Thoratec Corp., 376 F.3d 163 (3d Cir. 2004), the Tenth Circuit in Oja v. Howmedica,
Inc.; 111 F.3d 782 (10th Cir. 1997), held that the plaintiffs tort claims were not
preempted by the MDA because they would not impose device-specific state
requirements on the device in issue. Id. at 789. Similarly, in Goodlin v. Medtronic,
Inc., 167 F.3d 1367 (11th Cir. 1999), the Eleventh Circuit held that the FDA's premarket approval of the defendant's medical device imposed no device-specific federal
requirement and preemption did not apply. Id. at 1382. Following the Horn decision,
the Sixth and Seventh Circuits joined the Third Circuit's rationale and held the
plaintiffs' state tort claims preempted by the pre-market approval of the defendant's
medical devices. McMullen v. Medtronic, Inc., 421 F.3d 482, 490 (7th Cir. 2005);
Cupek v. Medtronic, Inc., 405 F.3d 421, 425 (6th Cir. 2005). Notably, the Supreme
Court denied petitions for certiorari in both McMullen and Cupek; thus, the split
remains. McMullen v. Medtronic, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1464, 1464 (2006) (denying
certiorari); Knisley v. Medtronic, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 420, 420 (2005) (denying certiorari).
24 See Suzanne Darrow Kleinhaus, Medtronic v. Lohr: For Want of a Word, the
Patient Was Almost Lost-Fixing the Mischief Caused in Cipollone by Dividing the
Preemption Stream, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 297, 298 (1998) (commenting on the
"mischief' created by the interpretation of the word "requirement"). Notably, the
word "requirement" is used in section 360k and other sections of the MDA to refer
only to positive statutory and regulatory enactments. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,
518 U.S. 470, 489-90 (1996) (plurality opinion).
[S]ubsections (a)(2) and (b) of [section 360k] also refer to "requirements"but those "requirements" refer only to statutory and regulatory law that
exists pursuant to the MDA itself, suggesting that the pre-empted
"requirements" established or continued by States also refer primarily to

positive

enactments

of

state

law ....

Of

the

limited

number

of

"exemptions" from pre-emption that the FDA has granted, none even
remotely resemble common-law claims.
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in order for preemption to apply.2 5 This is the concept of device
specificity.
Some courts have found preemption limited to
situations where both the state and federal requirements are
developed "with respect to" a particular medical device, while
other courts have found preemption in any case where the federal
requirement was specific to the device, regardless of the state
26
claim's device specificity.
The federal requirements established by the FDA are
derived from the structure of the statute itself. The MDA divides
medical devices into three classes based upon the risk of injury
posed by each device. 27 Class I encompasses simple devices,
which are subject only to the general controls necessary to
provide the FDA with "reasonable assurance of the safety and
effectiveness of the device." 28 Class II devices are subject to
special controls because general controls are insufficient to
provide reasonable assurance of the safety and effectiveness of
the devices. 29 Class III devices are those that are used to support
or sustain human life, or present a potential risk of illness or
injury, such as pacemakers, cardiac catheters, and heart valves. 30
The MDA requires manufacturers of Class III devices to
receive pre-market approval ("PMA") from the FDA before the
device can be commercially manufactured and sold. 3 1 PMA
applications must contain sufficient information to provide the
25 Compare Oja, 111 F.3d at 788 (explaining that a court engaged in a
preemption analysis must consider the specificity of the state requirement in
relation to the particular device, as well as the device specificity of the federal
requirement), with Papike v. Tambrands, Inc., 107 F.3d 737, 742 (9th Cir. 1997)

(describing the focus of the preemption inquiry under Lohr as being on the device
specificity of the federal requirement).
26 See supra note 25. Courts that have focused solely on the specificity of the
federal requirement have even found preemption of state tort claims of general
applicability in direct derogation of the Code of Federal Regulations, which states
that "[section 360k] does not preempt State or local requirements of general
applicability." 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d)(1) (2005); see also Mitchell v. Collagen Corp., 126
F.3d 902, 911-13 (7th Cir. 1997) (reaffirming an earlier holding that general claims,
such as strict liability and breach of implied warranty of merchantability, would
impose burdens on the manufacturer that were different from or in addition to those
imposed by the FDA).
27 See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a).
28 Id. § 360c(a)(1)(A). Crutches and tongue depressors are examples of Class I
devices. Bivans, supra note 1, at 1090.
29 See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(B). Tampons and oxygen masks are examples of
Class II devices. Bivans, supra note 1, at 1091.
30 See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C); see also Bivans, supra note 1, at 1091.
31 See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C).
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FDA with reasonable assurance of the device's safety and
efficacy. 32 In some instances, a manufacturer can bypass the
PMA process by showing its device to be substantially equivalent
to a device that was commercially distributed prior to the 1976
effective date of the MDA, unless a separate regulation is
promulgated requiring an application for PMA.33 In such a case,
the manufacturer may continue to market the device pursuant to
section 510(k) of the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act unless and
until the FDA orders the manufacturer to submit an application
for full PIA approval. 34 This latter clearance method was
employed by the defendant manufacturer in the seminal medical
35
device products liability case, Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr.
In Lohr, the United States Supreme Court took up the issue
of tort claim preemption under the MDA. The case concerned the
recipient of a defective pacemaker who brought claims of strict
36
liability and negligence against the manufacturer of the device.
The device in question did not undergo the full PMA approval
process, but instead received FDA clearance under the
substantial equivalency provision of section 510(k). 37 The Lohrs'
negligence claims alleged breach of the manufacturer's "duty to
use reasonable care in the design, manufacture, assembly, and
sale" of the product, as well as failure to warn or properly
32 See id. The application includes reports concerning the safety and
effectiveness of the device, a statement of the components, ingredients, and
principles of operation, a full description of the methods of manufacture and
processing, references to any performance standards that would have been required
of the device if it were in Class II, samples of the device and the labeling, and other
relevant information. See id. § 360e(c)(1)(A)-(G). The FDA must respond to the
application within 180 days of its submission by either issuing an order of approval
or denial. Id. § 360e(d)(1)(A).
The FDA must approve the application within 180 days unless (1) there is a
failure to establish a reasonable assurance that the device is safe or
effective under the recommended conditions of use, (2) the manufacturing
methods do not conform to the requirements for good manufacturing
practices, (3) the proposed labeling is false or misleading, or (4) the device
does not conform to an applicable performance standard.
Bivans, supra note 1, at 1091.
33 See 21 U.S.C. § 360e(a)-(b).
34 See Bivans, supra note 1, at 1091-92. In addition, a medical-device
manufacturer may obtain an Investigational Device Exemption in order to enter into
clinical human studies of an experimental device prior to full PMA approval. Id. at
1092.

35 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
36 Id. at 481.
37 See id. at 492-94.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:753

instruct the patient or her physician of the attendant risks.3 8
The case resulted in a fractured Court opinion, with Justice
Stevens writing for the plurality. 39 Justice Breyer's vote created
a majority as to all but two parts of the plurality opinion. 40 The
Court essentially found that section 510(k) "substantial
equivalence" approval focused on equivalence rather than safety
and did not require the device in question to be formally reviewed
by the FDA. 41 The Court stated that the FDA's clearance of the
pacemaker did not require the device to "take any particular
form for any particular reason." 42 Therefore, the Court concluded
that the substantial equivalence clearance of the pacemaker did
not establish any specific federal requirements for the device and
43
did not conflict with or preempt the plaintiffs claims.
Although the Court's decision ultimately turned on the lack
of a device-specific federal requirement, parts of the opinion also
suggested that the plaintiffs claims did not seek to impose a
specific state requirement and were too general to be preempted.
Furthermore, the Court stated that although it was not holding
that a general state requirement could never be preempted, there
was an "overarching concern that pre-emption occur only where a
particular state requirement threatens to interfere with a specific
federal interest."44 A majority of the Court agreed that for
preemption to apply, a state claim must reach a minimum level
of device specificity; 4 5 however, a majority did not agree on what
the requisite level of specificity was and did not discuss how a
court faced with the question should make such a
determination. 46 Importantly, the Court concluded that any
38

Id. at 481 (citation omitted).

39 See id. at 473.
40

See id.

41 See id. at 493.
42 Id.
43 See id. at 493-94.
44 Id. at 500.
45 See id. (maintaining that "[s]tate requirements must be 'with respect to'

medical devices and 'different from, or in addition to,' federal requirements").
46 See id. at 501-02; id. at 502-03 (plurality opinion). The plurality asserted
that the state common law claims were not device-specific requirements as
contemplated by section 360k:
[G]iven the critical importance of device specificity in our . . . construction
of § 360k, it is apparent that few, if any, common-law duties have been preempted by this statute. It will be rare indeed for a court hearing a common
law cause of action to issue a decree that has 'the effect of establishing a
substantive requirement for a specific device.'
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state requirements created by the Lohrs' tort claims for negligent
manufacture and failure to warn were far too general to be "with
respect" to the device, and this generality left them outside the
47
ambit of section 360k(a).
The- Lohr opinion also underscored the importance of
deferring to congressional intent in cases where a federal statute
expressly preempts a state law, but the exact scope of preemption
is unclear. 48 The Court stated that Congress' purpose in passing
the MDA preemption provision, as well as the purpose of the
underlying statute, is the "ultimate touchstone" in determining
the scope of preemption. 4 9 Furthermore, the plurality opinion
argued that because the use of the word "requirement" in the
preemption provision of the MDA was ambiguous, the Court had
to look at both legislative history and statutory purpose to
determine Congress' intended scope of preemption. 50
The
plurality stated that because Congress enacted the MDA to place
more stringent controls on medical device manufacturers, it
would be "perverse" to use the statute to absolve reflexively the
51
entire industry from liability for the injuries it causes.
Justice Breyer concurred separately, stating that he did not
agree with the plurality's view that incidents of MDA preemption
of common law claims by the MDA would be "few" or "rare."52 He
agreed, however, with the plurality's finding that the Lohrs' tort
claims were not preempted because they did not conflict with any
53
specific federal requirements.
The Lohr decision left unanswered the question of whether a
device approved under the more stringent PMA process, rather
than the section 510(k) substantial equivalence process, would
impose specific federal requirements sufficient to preempt tort
claims. If it did, a court would be required next to determine
whether state tort claims were device-specific. These issues were
addressed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third

Id. (quoting 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d)(6)(ii) (1995)). Justice Breyer, however, did not join
in this part of the opinion.
47 Id. at 502 (majority opinion).
48 See id. at 484-86.
49 Id. at 485-86.
50 See id. at 487-91 (plurality opinion).
51

Id. at 487.

52

Id. at 508 (Breyer, J., concurring).

53 See id.
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Circuit in Horn v. Thoratec Corp.54
B. Horn v. Thoratec Corp.
In Horn, the Third Circuit faced the question of whether the
federal requirements imposed on a device that received full PMA
approval, rather than merely section 510(k) clearance, preempted
the claimant's Pennsylvania common law tort claims for defective
design, defective manufacture, and failure to warn. 55
On
January 17, 1998, Daniel Horn suffered a heart attack and his
doctors determined that he needed a heart transplant. 56 Before a
donor heart became available, Mr. Horn's condition deteriorated,
and on January 22, 1998, a HeartMate pump, manufactured by
defendant Thoratec, was implanted to provide circulatory
57
assistance between the ventricle and aorta of Mr. Horn's heart.
In early May of the same year, "Mr. Horn began bleeding
58
from the spot where the HeartMate tube exited his body."
Exploratory surgery revealed that the suture covering the screw
ring connection of the device had worn off and the screw ring had
disconnected. 59 The
surgeon
conducting
the
operation
determined that the suture had worn through from rubbing
against the patient's sternum.6 0 The disconnection allowed an
air embolus to travel to Mr. Horn's brain, rendering him brain
dead.6 1 On May 8, 1998, Mr. Horn's doctors discontinued life
support and his viable organs were donated for transplantation. 62
Subsequently, Mrs. Horn filed a complaint in the United
54

376 F.3d 163 (3d Cir. 2004).

55 See id. at 165.
56

Id.

Horn v. Thermo Cardiosystems, Inc., 229 F. Supp. 2d 381, 384 (M.D. Pa.
2002), aff'd sub nom. Horn v. Thoratec Corp., 376 F.3d 163 (3d Cir. 2004). The
HeartMate consisted of a "pump body" and two conduit assemblies. Id. On one side
of the pump, a conduit was attached to the aorta; this was the outlet side because
blood flowed from the device into the aorta and then out to the patient's body. Id.
Between the pump body and the outlet was a small tube connection, otherwise
known as the "elbow." Id. The elbow was attached by screw into the pump housing
with a screw ring tightened over it. Id. To prevent the screw ring from rotating, a
suture was tied over the screw ring and attached to the adaptor conduit. Id. The
device was fully assembled during manufacture and required no manipulation from
the implanting surgeon. Id.
58 Horn, 376 F.3d at 165.
59 See id.
60 See Thermo Cardiosystems,229 F. Supp. 2d at 384.
61 Horn, 376 F.3d at 165.
62 See id.
57
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States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
against the manufacturer Thoratec, primarily claiming that the
HeartMate was defectively designed. 63
In addition, her
compliant alleged negligence for "(1) failure to test and study
adequately the HeartMate; (2) failure to provide adequate
warnings regarding the possibility that the screw ring may
disconnect; (3) failure to provide adequate instructions to
'64
physicians; and (4) failure to use proper suture material.
Furthermore, Mrs. Horn claimed strict liability against Thoratec
for "(1) failure to use 'good manufacturing practices'; and (2)
65
failure to provide adequate warnings."
The district court granted Thoratec's motion for summary
judgment using the familiar two-prong preemption test
previously endorsed by the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits. 66 The
test required a device-specific federal requirement and a devicespecific state requirement that was different from, or in addition
to, the federal requirement. 67 The district court found that "the
HeartMate's PMA approval process imposed a specific federal
requirement applicable to the HeartMate," and if Mrs. Horn
prevailed, "any [state] judgment that the HeartMate was unsafe
or otherwise substandard would be in direct conflict
[with] ...the FDA's determination that the product was suitable
for use." 68
On appeal, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
69
affirmed the district court's decision by a two-judge majority.
The Third Circuit adopted the two-prong test used by the
district court. 70 First, the court addressed whether the PMA
approval process placed specific federal requirements on the
HeartMate. 7 1 The court held that when the FDA grants approval
by the exhaustive PMA mechanism, it imposes extensive devicespecific federal requirements sufficient to give rise to preemption
63 See id. Specifically, the complaint asserted that "[h]ad the screw ring been of
an appropriate and feasible design.., the disconnection which ultimately caused
Mr. Horn's death would never have occurred." Thermo Cardiosystems, 229 F. Supp.

2d at 384-85.
64 Id. at 385.
65 Id.
66 See
67 See

Horn, 376 F.3d at 165.
Kemp v. Medtronic, Inc., 231 F.3d 216, 224-25 (6th Cir. 2000); Goodlin v.
Medtronic, Inc., 167 F.3d 1367, 1372 (11th Cir. 1999).
68 Horn, 376 F.3d at 165.
69 See id. at 163-64.
70
71

See id. at 169-73.
See id. at 169.
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under section 360k(a) of the MDA. 72 The court distinguished the
instant matter from the Lohr case by pointing out that the
product at issue in Lohr had undergone the far less stringent
section 510(k) approval process. 73 The court emphasized that the
Lohr Court found that the section 510(k) clearance process did
not impose any federal requirement specific to the device, but
rather imposed only the generic requirements that the device be
safe and substantially equivalent to predecessor devices.7 4 In
contrast, the PMA approval process employed for the HeartMate
included the FDA's review of the device's manufacturing,
packaging, storage, labeling, distribution, and advertising. 75 In
addition, the court found that years of mandatory submissionsincluding live animal and human cadaver studies, clinical trials,
and design alterations-unquestionably imposed specific federal
requirements on the HeartMate's design, testing, intended use,
and performance standards. 76 Therefore, the court held that the
Lohr decision did not control the first prong of the preemption
test here and there were sufficiently specific federal standards
77
applicable to the HeartMate.
The Third Circuit then turned to the second prong of the
preemption analysis and examined the state requirements
imposed by Mrs. Horn's common law tort claims. 78 Mrs. Horn
argued that her state common law claims did not seek to
establish device-specific state requirements because they were
founded on the general duties to use due care in manufacturing
and to warn users of attendant risks. 79 The court rejected this
argument. The court began by acknowledging that Mrs. Horn
was not asserting claims specific to the device or alleging
protection under any statute of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania.8 0 In fact, the court characterized Mrs. Horn's
72

See id. at 170.

73
74
75
76
77

See
See
See
See
See

78

See id. at 173.

id.
id.
id.
id.
id.

at 168.
at 170.
at 169-70.
at 169.

79 Id. at 166.

80 Id. at 173. Concededly, if the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania had established
requirements with respect to the HeartMate, they would be preempted as positive
enactments imposing specific state requirements different from or in addition to
federal requirements, and Mrs. Horn would be unable to seek compensation under
them. See 21 U.S.C § 360k(a) (2000).
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claims as general, common law claims, "which [were] not specific
'with respect to' the HeartMate."'' s The court determined that the
only remaining question was whether Mrs. Horn's general claims
could constitute requirements different from or in addition to the
federal requirements promulgated by Congress in section
82
360k(a).
To answer that question, the court took note of the Lohr
Court's holding that the common law claims for negligent
manufacture and failure to warn were too general to be "with
respect to" the particular device.8 3 The court recognized that the
state claims Mrs. Horn brought against Thoratec were
"essentially the same" as the claims asserted in Lohr,8 4 but that
did not end the inquiry. The Third Circuit stated that it would
follow Justice Breyer's Lohr concurrence under the Court's
"'narrowest ground' approach."8 5 The court interpreted Justice
Breyer's concurrence to mean that when considering preemption,
a court should carefully examine each of the state common law
claims to determine whether the "claim would impose a
or adds a greater
substantive requirement that conflicts with,
86
requirement."
federal
burden to, a specific
Although the Third Circuit claimed to adopt a careful and
systematic approach to the preemption analysis, the court gave
only a bundled and cursory examination to Mrs. Horn's claims.
Without much scrutiny, the court decided that Mrs. Horn's
general state law claims would impose substantive requirements
on the HeartMate that would conflict with or add to those
imposed by the FDA.8 7 The court found Mrs. Horn's claim that
the screw ring was negligently designed would force Thoratec to

81 Horn, 376 F.3d at 174.
82 Id. at 173-74.
83 See id. at 174.
84

Id.

See id. at 175. Although Justice Stevens' plurality opinion in Lohr determined
that section 360k did not preempt most common law duties, Justice Breyer
85

concluded that it would preempt a common law duty that was similar to the state
requirements contained in statutes, rules, or regulations that were preempted by the
FDA. See id. Therefore, the Third Circuit decided to follow Justice Breyer's
concurrence given that his rationale was narrower than the plurality. See id.
86 Id. at 174. Although the court announced this as the proper analysis for
preemption under the MDA, it failed to engage in a full independent examination of
each state tort claim alleged in the complaint. See infra notes 87-89 and
accompanying text.
87 See Horn, 376 F.3d at 176.
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alter the FDA-approved design by changing either the screw-ring
feature or the suture used to hold it in place.8 8 In addition,
without an in-depth explanation, the court found that Mrs.
Horn's failure-to-warn claim would require Thoratec to provide
warnings and instructions different from those approved by the
FDA.8 9 Thus, the court found that all of Mrs. Horn's claims were
preempted.
In dissent, Judge Julio Fuentes stated that for state tort
claims to be preempted, they had to impose specific requirements
on the manufacturer that would conflict with the requirements
imposed by the federal standards or otherwise frustrate
congressional intent. 90
He contended that requirements of
general applicability are not preempted and a common law claim
must impose some exacting requirement upon the specific device
for preemption to apply. 91 Judge Fuentes asserted that the
claims here were far too general for preemption, and even though
the majority gave lip service to the device specificity
requirement, it failed to employ that standard fully. 92
Judge Fuentes acknowledged that a judgment against
Thoratec might have the indirect consequence of holding the
HeartMate to a higher standard than the FDA required, but he
noted that the Lohr Court authorized such a result. 93 He
explained that Congress, through section 360k(a), and the Lohr
Court were aiming to prevent a manufacturer from facing specific
state requirements that were "different from, or in addition to[,J"
federal requirements. 94 Judge Fuentes argued that since Mrs.
Horn's state common law claims merely alleged the breach of a
generalized duty of care and not device-specific inadequacies, no
conflicting obligations would emerge from a jury award in her
favor, and her claims were therefore not preempted. 95
The majority of federal courts that have addressed the

88 See

id.

89 Id.

90 See id. at 180-82, 184-85 (Fuentes, J., dissenting).
91 See id. at 182. In fact, Judge Fuentes argued that the FDA's reference to the
specificity of the state requirements would have been superfluous if the specificity of
the federal device requirements was all that mattered to the preemption analysis.
See id.
92 See id. at 181.
93 See id. at 184.
94 See id. at 180-82.
95 See id. at 184.
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preemption question, where the offending device has received full
PMA approval, have held that the FDA's rigorous level of
scrutiny, and the FDA's continuous ability to withdraw its
approval, are sufficient to impose device-specific federal
requirements on the manufacturer. 96 Although it may be argued
that PMA approval is not necessarily tantamount to a specific
federal requirement, 97 this Comment does not dispute that the
PMA approval process imposed specific federal requirements on
the HeartMate. Therefore, the remainder of this Comment will
analyze only the state requirements that would have allegedly
been imposed by Mrs. Horn's tort claims.
Because the
preemptive scope of section 360k is ambiguous, the Horn court
should have looked to the legislative history and purpose of the
MDA before concluding that Mrs. Horn's tort claims were
preempted. Furthermore, the regulations promulgated by the
FDA support a thorough examination of the potential
requirements arising from each state tort claim and an
evaluation of whether those requirements would conflict with the
requirements imposed by the FDA. The Horn court did neither.
If it had engaged in a more thorough analysis of Mrs. Horn's
claims, at least some would have survived preemption.

96 See, e.g., Martin v. Medtronic, Inc., 254 F.3d 573, 583-84 (5th Cir. 2001);
Kemp v. Medtronic, Inc., 231 F.3d 216, 226-28 (6th Cir. 2000); Mitchell v. Collagen
Corp., 126 F.3d 902, 913 (7th Cir. 1997). But see Goodlin v. Medtronic, Inc., 167 F.3d
1367, 1375 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that the PMA approval process does not impose
federal device-specific requirements). The Goodlin court found that although the
FDA requires a showing that a device is safe and effective prior to submission to the
market, the FDA's review, supporting information, and actual approval do not
impose any ascertainable requirements on the device. See id. The court stated that
at no point during review or upon approval does the FDA issue a "regulation, order,
or any other statement of its substantive benchmark." Id. The court held that
approval was merely a determination by the FDA that the manufacturer furnished
reasonable assurances of safety and effectiveness without indication of what
substantive requirements the agency applied to reach its result. See id.
Furthermore, the Goodlin court found that the "Conditions of Approval" document
accompanying the FDA's notice of approval was merely a list of rules and
regulations generally applicable to all devices approved through the PMA process,
such as the obligation to report adverse events. See id. at 1377. Finally, the court
stated that permission to market the device is not "implied validation of the safety of
[the] device and every step of its manufacture." Id. at 1375-76.
97 See supra note 96.
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II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, PURPOSE, AND STRUCTURE OF THE
MEDICAL DEVICE AMENDMENTS

"[P]roblems arise when... federal legislation does not
clearly disclose its intended impact on state laws....
[P]reemption rulings often turn on a determination of
congressional intent in the setting of the particular text,
history[,] and purposes of the federal legislation involved. 98 As
there is no clear statement from Congress that state tort claims
are always preempted under section 360k, the Horn court should
have looked to the legislative history, purpose, and structure of
the MDA to discern congressional intent regarding the scope of
preemption. Such an examination suggests that Congress did
not intend to preempt state tort claims in all situations.
Part III of the Lohr opinion-part of the majority holdingdirects a court considering the preemption question to view
section 360k(a) as informed by two statutory presumptions.
First, federalism requires that the traditional police powers of
the states are not to be "'superseded by the Federal Act unless
that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.'-99 Second,
courts must view congressional purpose as "the ultimate
touchstone" when analyzing the scope of a statute's express
preemption provision. 100 By looking for a clear statement from
Congress, the Lohr Court implied that statutory preemption
should apply to state tort claims only where Congress has faced
and intentionally brought into issue the preemption of such
claims. 10 1 Where there is no clear statement and congressional
intent is unclear, however, a presumption against preemption
arises, and courts should be reluctant to preempt state tort
claims. 10 2 This presumption is even stronger where, as here, the

98 SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 16, at 324.
99 Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)) (emphasis added).
100 Id. (quoting Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963)).
101 See Grey, supra note 17, at 609-10 (quoting Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n
v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 109 (1991)).
102 See id. at 565. The presumption against preemption arises from federalism
concerns and the traditional power of the states to regulate the health and safety of
their citizens. Id. at 585. "Few values are more central to federalism than the right
of states to provide a compensatory remedy for their injured citizens." Id. at 565; see
also Bivans, supra note 1, at 1122 (describing certain common law claims as
historically in the province of states and demanding that Congress clearly indicate
its intention to preempt them).
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federal statute does not afford the injured party an alternative
103
remedy.
In addition to the absence of a clear congressional statement,
there is no indication anywhere in the MDA or its legislative
history that Congress intended to include state tort claims in the
express preemption provision. 10 4 Instead, there is evidence
suggesting that Congress included the express preemption
provision in the MDA as a direct response to individual states
enacting their own regulatory approval procedures for medical
devices sold within their borders. 10 5 Thus, the legislative history
shows that "Congress crafted a preemption provision that
permitted state regulatory programs to remain in place until the
FDA
implemented
specific
counterpart
regulations.
Thereafter,... FDA regulations would preempt conflicting
10 6
state... regulatory measures."'
Moreover, in Lohr, Justice Stevens wrote that it is "'difficult
to believe that Congress would, without comment, remove all
means of judicial recourse for those injured by [improper]
conduct.' "107 He maintained that it would take much clearer
language than that of section 360k in order to convince him that
103 See Grey, supra note 17, at 563, 571. Where the preemption defense is
upheld, the injured parties have to carry the entire burden of their injury. See Chase
Garwood, III, Mitchell v. Collagen Corp. A Trend in Defensive Use of MDA
Preemption, 5 J. PHARMACY & L. 191, 198 (1996). There is no provision for
compensation of injuries or expenses resulting from medical device malfunction in
the MDA. See id. at 198-99; see also 21 U.S.C. § 360h(b)(2) (2000). The statute only
requires the manufacturer of a malfunctioning device to repair or to replace the
device or to refund the purchase price. 21 U.S.C. § 360h(b)(2). In addition,
congressional silence with respect to state tort claims is particularly significant
where there is a failure to provide a federal remedy for injured persons. See
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251 (1984) (holding that the Atomic
Energy Act did not preempt the plaintiffs tort claims because there was no
indication that Congress had considered precluding state remedies for injuries in
nuclear plants).
104 See Garwood, supra note 103, at 197; Grey, supra note 17, at 606 (indicating
that the impact of the MDA on state tort claims was not discussed in legislative
history); see also S. REP. No. 94-33, at 1-50 (1976), as reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1070, 1070-103; H.R. REP. No. 94-1090, at 51-66 (1976) (Conf. Rep.),
as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1103, 1103-18; H.R. REP. No. 94-853 (1976); 121
CONG. REC. 10687-710 (1975).
105 See Vladeck, supra note 19, at 104-05 (noting that before Congress enacted
the MDA, California had passed procedures for pre-market approval of intrauterine
devices, while other states regulated hearing aides).
106 Id.
107 Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 487 (1996) (plurality opinion) (quoting
Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 251).
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a result.10 8 Yet, the legislative history
debate about the inclusion of state tort
"requirement." 10 9 It is unlikely that
all remedy without intense discussion,

Id.

109 See Robert J. Katerberg, Patching the "Crazy Quilt" of Cipollone: A Divided

Court Rethinks Federal Preemption of Products Liability in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,
75 N.C. L. REV. 1440, 1463-64 (1997). The legislative history contains statements
from both Houses such as, "[t]he legislation is written so that the benefit of the
doubt is always given to the consumer." Id. at 1464 (quoting 121 CONG. REC. 10688
(1975) (statement of Sen. Kennedy)). Yet, conspicuously absent from the legislative
materials is any mention of state tort claims. See id.; see also Dega, supra note 21, at
655 ("[T]he MDA's legislative history does 'not [contain] one word of debate or
commentary address[ing] state tort law remedies.'" (quoting Reply Brief for
Appellant at 17, Talbott v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 63 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 1995) (No. 94-1951))).
110 See Dega, supra note 21, at 655; see also Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505
U.S. 504, 541-42 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Cipollone involved common law claims alleging that cigarette manufacturers
breached express warranties contained in their advertisements, failed to warn of the
hazards of smoking, fraudulently misrepresented those hazards, and conspired to
deprive the public of information about smoking. Id. at 508 (majority opinion). The
Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965 and the Public Heath
Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 each contained express preemption provisions. See id.
at 514-15. The 1965 Act stated that "[n]o statement relating to smoking and health
shall be required in the advertising of any cigarettes the packages of which are
labeled in conformity with the provisions of [the] Act." Id. at 514 (quoting Federal
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341 (2000))). The 1969 Act contained different
language, stating that "[n]o requirement or prohibitionbased on smoking and health
shall be imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any
cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of
[the] Act." Id. at 515 (quoting Public Heath Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L.
No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87 (1970) (codified at 15 USC §§ 1331-1341 (2000))) (emphasis
added). The issue for the Court was whether either one or both of these provisions
included the preemption of state common law claims. Id. at 517. In a plurality
opinion authored by Justice Stevens, the Court held that the 1969 Act, but not the
1965 Act, preempted some of the plaintiffs common law claims. See id. at 530-31
(plurality opinion). Justice Stevens was convinced that in the 1969 Act, Congress
intended to include common law actions in the phrase "requirement or prohibition."
See id. at 522. In addition, Justice Stevens reasoned that although there was no
reference to common law actions in the 1969 Act's legislative history, the "obviously
broader language of the 1969 version extended that section's pre-emptive reach." Id.
at 521, 523. Furthermore, the version of the 1969 Act passed by the Senate
preempted "any State statute or regulation"; this language was later replaced in the
bill (and ultimately passed and signed) with the words "State law." Id. at 523
(quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1970); S. REP. No. 91-566, at 16 (1969)). Justice
Stevens found that this modification was a clear indication of Congress' intent to
include some common law tort actions in the preemption provision. Id. Notably, the
Court's decision in Cipollone prompted defendants to start asserting the defense of
preemption in medical device liability cases. See Katerberg, supra note 109, at 1469.
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Furthermore, congressional activity since the enactment of
the MDA is inconsistent with a finding that Congress intended to
include state tort claims under the express preemption provision.
For example, to encourage the reporting of medical device failure,
Congress promulgated the Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990
("SMDA").1 11 By not allowing those reports to be entered into
evidence in civil litigation against device manufacturers, the
112
SMDA preserved the confidentiality of persons making them.
Congress' explicit reference to civil litigation demonstrates that it
indeed anticipated lawsuits against manufacturers and thus
never intended to eliminate such cases. 11 3 Also, the legislative
history of the SMDA indicates that Congress viewed products
liability law as a mechanism for holding device manufacturers
accountable for consumers' injuries and enhancing device
safety. 11 4 Additionally, in 1995, the House of Representatives
passed a bill that would have all but eliminated punitive
damages in products liability actions against medical device
manufacturers.1 1 5 Although the bill was ultimately vetoed by the
President, its mere proposal demonstrates that Congress did not
believe that state common law tort claims were entirely
116
preempted by the MDA.
Further, the legislative purpose behind the MDA suggests
that Congress did not intend to include state tort claims in the
express preemption provision. The purpose of the MDA is to
protect the health and safety of device users.1 17 One sponsor of
the bill stated: "[W]ithout [the Act,] the American people will
111

See H.R. REP. No. 101-808, at 21 (1990).

See id. ("The reports may not be admitted into evidence or otherwise used in
any civil actions involving private parties. However, there is no prohibition on civil
litigation about the events that are the subject of the report.").
113 See Bivans, supranote 1, at 1105.
114 See id. at 1119 ("Explicitly recognized in the legislative history of the SMDA
112

was the role of products liability law in holding the industry accountable for
defective medical devices.").
115 See Common Sense Product Liability and Legal Reform Act of 1995, H.R.
956, 104th Cong. § 201(f) (1995), as reprinted in 141 CONG. REC. H2941-48 (daily ed.
Mar. 9, 1995); see also Katerberg, supra note 109, at 1464 n.175 (summarizing

progression of bill).
116

Cf. Bob Herbert, A Gift for Drug Makers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2005, at A23

(discussing President Bush's support for a similar prohibition on punitive damages,
demonstrating that members of both the executive and legislative branches believe

that not all tort claims against device manufacturers are automatically preempted
by the MDA).
117

See Grey, supra note 17, at 583.
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continue to be subjected to indefensible risk of illness, injury and
even death ....
After all it is the consumer who pays with his
health and his life for medical device malfunctions."' 118 Congress
therefore enacted the MDA primarily to promote the safety and
effectiveness of medical devices, not to insulate manufacturers
from liability. 119
In Lohr, the plurality reasoned that because there was no
private right of action contained in the MDA, complete tort
preemption would have the "perverse effect" of giving immunity
to an industry that Congress believed was in need of increased
regulatory control. 20 This result remains the same whether the
device was approved by the section 510(k) process or by the PMA
process. It is unlikely that Congress would intentionally allow
compensation for persons injured by devices that reached the
market through the section 510(k) approval process, but would
eliminate it entirely for consumers equally harmed by a device
approved under the PMA process. If Congress intended this
disparate result, there would be at least some evidence of that
intention in the legislative history or in the text of the
preemption provision itself-yet no such evidence exists. 12 1
Finally, the structure of the MDA supports the conclusion
that Congress did not intend to preempt state tort remedies.
Specifically, section 360h(d) contains a savings clause which
provides:
Compliance with an order issued under this section shall not
relieve any person from liability under Federal or State law. In
awarding damages for economic loss in an action brought for the
enforcement of any such liability, the value to the plaintiff in
such action of any remedy provided him under such order shall
12 2
be taken into account.
This clause indicates that even after taking required remedial
actions, a manufacturer will not be insulated from all liability.
Congress' recognition of the possibility of litigation against device
manufacturers thus strongly suggests that it did not intend to

11s 121 CONG. REC. 10688 (1975) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).

119See Grey, supra note 17, at 583.
120 See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 487 (1996) (plurality opinion).
121 See Bivans, supra note 1, at 1113-14; Dega, supra note 21, at 654-56 ("The
absence of a clear statement by Congress remains a significant consideration in
weighing against preemption.").
122 21 U.S.C. § 360h(d) (emphasis added).
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preempt all state tort claims under the statute's express
123
preemption provision.
Moreover,
Congress' undefined
use
of the
word
"requirement" in the text of the preemption provision does not
make "clear and manifest" what constitutes
a state
"requirement."
Notably, the only time the Supreme Court
attempted to discern Congress' intended meaning, it found that
the state tort claim escaped preemption. 124 In fact, in Lohr,
Justice Stevens remarked that if Congress intended to include
state tort claims in the term "requirement," "it chose a singularly
odd word with which to do it."125 Justice Stevens argued that
"requirement" applied only to positive state enactments, such as
legislation or administrative rules. He stated that Congress
could have made clear its intent to preempt tort claims by simply
substituting or adding the word "remedy." 12 6 Indeed, Congress'
use of "requirement" in other areas of the statute refers only to
enactments by state legislatures and administrative bodies,
indicating that its use in the preemption provision refers only to
127
positive enactments and not to state tort awards.
Because it is unclear whether Congress intended to preempt
state tort claims by using the word "requirement" in section
360k, a court trying to determine congressional intent should
look to legislative history, purpose, and structure to inform its
123 See Bivans, supra note 1, at 1094 (indicating that such a conclusion is logical
even though the savings clause is not included in the same section as the preemption
provision).
124 See Lohr, 518 U.S. at 486-87 (plurality opinion) ("[The defendant] suggests
that any common-law cause of action is a 'requirement' which alters incentives and
imposes duties ....
[This] argument is not only unpersuasive, it is implausible.");
see also id. at 503 (majority opinion).
125 Id. at 487 (plurality opinion).
126 See id. Justice Stevens admitted that in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505

U.S. 504 (1992), the Court found the term "requirement" in the Public Health
Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 to include state common law remedies. See Lohr, 518
U.S. at 488 (plurality opinion). He stated, however, that because the statute was
limited to the health effects of smoking, and the preemption provision applied only
to the advertisement or promotion of cigarettes, the preemption provision at issue in
Cipollone had a far narrower effect on available damages than what Medtronic
proposed for the MDA. See id. As such, Justice Stevens noted, the plaintiff in
Cipollone was permitted to maintain theories of damage that "did not run afoul" of
the preemption provision. Id. In contrast, the broad interpretation proposed by
Medtronic of section 360k would result in wiping out all remedies available to the
plaintiff. Id. at 488-89.
127 See supra note 24 and accompanying text (discussing disagreement as to the
meaning of "requirement").

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:753

decision. Here, the legislative history of the MDA reveals that
Congress did not bring state tort awards into issue and
deliberately choose to preempt them. The purpose of the MDA,
furthermore, is to protect the consumer from injury, not to
protect the manufacturers from paying damages. Finally, within
the text of the MDA itself, Congress acknowledged deficiencies in
the device approval process and specifically stated that
manufacturers remain open to liability. If, after analyzing the
statute under this traditional interpretative framework, the
Horn court remained unconvinced that state tort claims survive
section 360k preemption, it should have gone on to examine the
regulations promulgated by the FDA before reflexively holding
Mrs. Horn's tort claims to be preempted.
III. THE ROLE AND THE WORD OF THE FDA
The regulations promulgated by the FDA to execute the
provisions of the MDA demonstrate that a court should not
automatically find preemption simply because the injuring device
received full PMA approval. Instead, the tenor of the FDA
regulations suggests that a court should examine each claim
individually to decide if it imposes requirements that conflict
with those the FDA imposed on the device. Here, the FDA has a
particularly important role in determining the scope of section
360k, because Congress specifically granted it the authority to
implement the provisions of the MDA. 128 The Lohr Court agreed
128 See Lohr, 518 U.S. at 495-96. The MDA is enabling legislation with which
Congress gave the FDA complete control to determine what requirements should be
placed on medical devices. Compare this to other authority-delegating statutes
where Congress has kept that power for itself and prescribed the exact
manufacturing requirements within 'the text of the statute, leaving the agency only
the ability to enforce the statutory provisions. For example, the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide and Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA") gives the Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") the authority to register an insecticide if it meets the safety
standards outlined in the Act itself. The EPA, however, does not have the authority
to define the safety requirements themselves. See Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and
Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(5) (2000); see also Grey, supra note 17, at 589
(noting that a pesticide will not be registered by the EPA unless it meets FIFRA's
requirements). Under the MDA, a manufacturer cannot even raise the defense of
preemption unless the FDA, acting under its statutory authority, has set forth
specific device requirements. See Lohr, 518 U.S. at 496. Because Congress has
empowered the FDA both to enforce and to interpret the MDA, a court should give
deference to the FDA's interpretation of the preemption clause. Cf. Katerberg, supra
note 109, at 1483 (writing that broader congressional delegation of authority in
MDA to FDA "laid the foundation for the high deference that Justice Stevens
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that, in the absence of a clear guiding statement from Congress,
courts must give substantial deference to the regulations of the
relevant administrative agency.129
Horn, in attempting to resolve the preemptive scope of the
MDA, failed to take note of two important FDA regulations.
First, the FDA regulation codified at 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d) states
that "[section 360k] does not preempt State or local requirements
of general applicability where the purpose of the requirement
relates ... to other products in addition to devices." 130
The
regulation gives examples of requirements that would not be
preempted, such as "general electrical codes, and the Uniform
Commercial Code (warranty of fitness), or ...unfair trade
practices in which the requirements are not limited to devices."' 3
The Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A derives from
the common law the notion that '[o]ne who sells any product in a
defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or
consumer. . . is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused. .".."132
Likewise, many common law duties-such as
those relied upon by Mrs. Horn and the plaintiff in Lohr-are
generally applicable to all products, not just medical devices. 133
Lohr, for instance, found that the common law duties at issue
were not sufficiently specific to be preempted. 3 4 The Court
reasoned that the general duties to use due care to avoid
foreseeable dangers and to inform users of the risks involved
with potentially dangerous items were applicable to all products
and were too broad to impede the implementation and
enforcement of federal safety requirements. 1 35 Like the Uniform
Commercial Code and general trade practices excluded from
granted to the FDA's interpretation of preemption"); Kleinhaus, supra note 24, at
316 (emphasizing that Lohr "affirm[ed] the role and authority of [the] FDA").
129 See Lohr, 518 U.S. at 505-06 (Breyer, J., concurring).
130 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d)(1) (2005) (emphasis added).
131 Id.
132 JOHNSON

& GUNN, supra note 12, at 707 (emphasis added) (quoting

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1) (1965)). A product is in a defective

condition if at the time it leaves the hands of the seller, it is "in a condition not
contemplated by the ultimate consumer which will be unreasonably dangerous to
him." Id. at 708. This applies even if the seller has exercised all possible care in the
preparation of the product. Id. at 707. In addition, holding the seller to strict liability
"does not preclude liability based upon the alternative ground of negligence." Id.
133 See Lohr, 518 U.S. at 501.
134 See id. ("Ihe general state common-law requirements in this suit were not
specifically developed 'with respect to' medical devices.").
135 See id.
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preemption by the FDA, the Court held that these common law
duties were "no more a threat to federal requirements than
would be a state-law duty to comply with local fire prevention
regulations[,] ... or to use due care in the training and
supervision of a work force."'136 The Horn court expressly
acknowledged that Mrs. Horn's claims were general, not devicespecific, and essentially the same as those in Lohr.13 7 Thus,
because most of Mrs. Horn's claims were general in nature and
would not impede the implementation of federal requirements,
they too should have escaped preemption.
A second provision of the FDA regulations also implies that
Congress did not intend to include state tort claims in section
360k. Section 808.1(c) codifies the procedure by which the
Commissioner of the FDA may grant an exemption from
preemption and thereby allow a state or political subdivision to
impose a substantive state requirement on a device. 138 Because
it is not the proper province of the courts to petition the
Commissioner of the FDA for an exemption for the purposes of a
tort remedy, 39 Congress was likely contemplating only
legislative and administrative enactments when it provided for
this exemption mechanism. 140 It is therefore equally likely that
Id. at 501-02.
See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
138 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(c) (2005). Section 360k(b) of the MDA provides that a state
or political subdivision may petition for an exemption where it seeks to impose a
requirement that is more stringent than the federal requirements, and the
requirement is necessary because of compelling local conditions. See 21 U.S.C.
§ 360k(b) (2000). The regulation promulgated by the FDA codifies the procedure by
which such an exemption could be granted. See 21 C.F.R. § 808.1.
139 See Michael J. Diamondstein, Comment, Illinois: An Oasis in the Middle of a
Judicial Desert, Haudrich v. Howmedica, Inc., 2 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 331, 354
(1997) (arguing that courts could never apply for exemptions to a governmental
entity, such as the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare).
140 See Haudrich v. Howmedica, Inc., 642 N.E.2d 206, 209-11 (Ill. App. Ct.
1994), aff'd, 662 N.E.2d 1248 (Ill. 1996). In Haudrich, the court pointed out that
section 360k(a) provides that "no State or political subdivision ... may
establish.., any requirement...." Id. at 209 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a))
(omission in original) (emphasis omitted). The exemption allowance in section
360k(b) states that, "[u]pon application of a State or a political subdivision thereof,
the Secretary may... exempt... a requirement ....
Id. at 209 (quoting 21 U.S.C.
§ 360k(b)) (omission in original). The Court found that because courts cannot apply
for an exemption from the preemption provision, they were likely not included in the
meaning of "State or political subdivision" as the term was used in section 360k(b).
See id. at 209-10. Because a term is considered to carry the same meaning
throughout a statute, courts were also likely not included in section 360k(a). See id.
Thus, the court held that courts "cannot be the source of 'requirements' that are
136

137
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Congress was, similarly, only contemplating state legislative and
administrative enactments in the express preemption language
of section 360k. Quite simply, a court should not read state tort
claims into statutory provisions where Congress has left them
out. 14'
Overall, the FDA regulations pertaining to the MDA tend to
show that the duties implicated by Mrs. Horn's state tort claims
would not create a substantive requirement for the HeartMate.
The regulations are too general to interfere with the agency's
ability to implement the necessary federal standards. Moreover,
because the FDA has explicitly stated that generally applicable
claims will not be preempted, the claims here should have
survived preemption.
It must be noted that in its most recent opinion, the FDA
indicated that it now believes that the MDA preempts state tort
claims. 142 Because of the great weight to be accorded the FDA's
preempted," because they are not state or political subdivisions. Id. at 210. In
addition, the Haudrich court analyzed the FDA regulation by referencing the
exemption language from § 808.20(a) of the Code of Federal Regulations: "An
exemption may only be granted for a requirement that has been enacted,
promulgated, or issued in final form by the authorized body or official of the State or
political subdivision .. " Id. at 212 (quoting 21 C.F.R. § 808.20(a)). The court held
that "issued" referred to legislative or regulatory action because the words "enacted"
and "promulgated" "clearly refer to legislative and/or regulatory methods," and when
two or more analogous words are used in succession in a statute, they are
understood to express the same meaning. See id. (citing People v. Goldman, 287
N.E.2d 177, 179 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972)).
141 See Dega, supra note 21, at 648-49 ("[I]f the statute says 'anything' about
preemption, it should say 'everything.' ").
142 The FDA submitted an amicus curiae brief to the Horn court stating that it
was changing its previous opinion and now believed that state common-law claims
regarding PMA-approved devices are preempted. See Horn v. Thoratec Corp., 376
F.3d 163, 177 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting the FDA's view that PMA approval in this case
required preemption); Thoratec: New FDA Position on Device Preemption Should Be
Given Deference, 9-11 MEALEY'S EMERGING DRUGS & DEVICES, June 3, 2004, at 9
(noting the change in the FDA's position). The significance of this opinion letter,
however, is unclear because it contradicts the FDA's former position of nonpreemption, its argument made before the Supreme Court in Lohr, and parts of the
FDA regulations codified at 21 C.F.R § 808 (2004). See FDA's New Position on Device
Preemption Seen as ContradictingRegulation, 9-12 MEALEY'S EMERGING DRUGS &
DEVICES, June 17, 2004, at 5 [hereinafter FDA's New Position]. "'The FDA has
never questioned the continued viability of these regulations ....'" Id. (quoting
petitioner Barbara Horn). Yet the FDA's letter brief does not explain how its new
view is consistent with the regulations. Plaintiff,Device Maker Differ on Significance
of Government's New Stand on Preemption,PRODUCT SAFETY & LIABILITY REP., June
21, 2004, available at http://litigationcenter.bna.com/pic2flit.nsf/idBNAP-622PLR
[hereinafter Plaintiff,Device Maker Differ].

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:753

position on this issue, its new position is likely the strongest
point in favor of preemption. 143 However, even if the FDA has
changed its position, it has neither altered its official regulations
nor indicated that the courts should no longer heed those
regulations. 144 At a minimum, the confusion resulting from
contradictory FDA opinions-along with the legislative history,
purpose, and structure of the MDA-supports the assertion that
the Horn court should not have rushed to find Mrs. Horn's claims
preempted. Instead, the court should have reviewed each of the
claims more extensively to determine whether they would
45
directly conflict with the FDA requirements.

In addition, these statements conflict with previous FDA opinions. For example,
in one letter, the FDA Associate Commissioner for Regulatory Affairs wrote in
response to a request for an advisory opinion: 'There is no indication in the
legislative
history of
[section
360k]
that
Congress
intended ...[to]
preempt ...available legal remedies, or State or local statutes that only incidentally
apply to devices." Katerberg, supra note 109, at 1467 n.190 (quoting Letter from
Joseph P. Hile, Associate Commissioner for Regulatory Affairs, FDA, to Robert E.
Manchester, National Women's Health Network (Mar. 8, 1984), in Brief for CrossPetitioners Lora Lohr and Michael Lohr at 13a, Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S.
470 (1996) (Nos. 95-754 and 95-886)). In a letter to a Washington attorney, Joseph
Sheehan, Chief of the FDA Regulations Staff, stated that the "FDA believes that
[section 360k] does not preempt general product liability requirements." Id. (quoting
Letter from Joseph Sheehan, Chief, Regulations Staff, FDA, to Cindy Whaley,
Attorney (Feb. 2, 1987), in Brief for Cross-Petitioners Lora Lohr and Michael Lohr at
14a, Medtronic, 518 U.S. 470 (Nos. 95-754 and 95-886)). Finally, Richard Cooper,
former Chief Counsel to the FDA has written: "[The] FDA has no expertise or
authority for managing systems of redress for private injuries. The value judgments
necessary for such management-how the scales for plaintiffs and defendants should
be set up-are best left to legislatures and the courts." Id. at 1467-68 (quoting
Richard M. Cooper, Drug Labeling and Products Liability: The Role of the Food and
DrugAdministration, 41 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 233, 233 (1986)).
In January 2006, the FDA included a preemption analysis in the comments to its
final rule regarding prescription drug labeling. In the comments, the FDA reinforced
its position that "FDA approval of labeling.., preempts conflicting or contrary State
law." FDA Final Rule, Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human
Prescription Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3,922, 3,934 (Jan. 24, 2006)
(to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201, 314, 601). In its statement, the FDA includes, as
an example of a preempted claim, failure to warn arising from omission of
information on drug labels. Lisa Brennan, FDA Move May Aid Defense, LEGAL
TIMES, Feb. 6, 2006, at 10. In as much as the FDA seeks to treat medical devices in
the same manner as prescription drugs, the statement tends to show that the FDA is
moving toward a position more strongly in favor of preemption.
143 See supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text.
144 Cf. FDA's New Position,supra note 142, at 5.
145 See infra notes 146-48 and accompanying text.
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IV. THE STATE REQUIREMENT
As discussed above, because Congress did not explicitly
indicate whether it intended to include state common law tort
claims in section 360k, a court should look to the statutory
history, purpose, and structure of the MDA to discern
congressional intent. The legislative history shows that Congress
did not raise the issue of preemption of tort claims. Because the
legislative purpose of the MDA is to enhance the health and
safety of patients requiring medical devices, it is unlikely that
Congress would remove all redress for injured persons without
some discussion and debate. In addition, in other sections of the
MDA, Congress expressly noted that manufacturers were
vulnerable to liability. As these items suggest that Congress did
not intend to preempt all tort claims, it is proper for a court to
examine the regulations implemented by the FDA. In this case,
such regulations expressly state that general requirements, those
applicable to products, in addition to medical devices, will not be
preempted.
To determine if a plaintiffs claims are device-specific rather
than applicable to all products in general, a court must examine
each claim individually and determine if that claim would impose
requirements different from, or in addition to, the requirements
established by the FDA. 146 In fact, the Lohr Court instructed
that

"[tlhe

statute

and

regulations

. . .

require

a

careful

comparison between the allegedly
pre-empting federal
requirement
and
the
allegedly
pre-empted
state
requirement.. . "147 Further, Horn recognized that "[t]he more
logical reading of Justice Breyer's concurring opinion [in Lohr] is
that a court should carefully examine the state common law claim
in order to determine whether that claim would impose a
substantive requirement ... ,"148
146 See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 523 (1992) (plurality
opinion) (stating that, in light of the presumption against preemption, narrow
construction of the preemption provision at issue was proper and that each of the
plaintiffs common law claims had to be examined to determine whether it
constituted a "requirement"); Kemp v. Medtronic, Inc., 231 F.3d 216, 228-37 (6th
Cir. 2000) (reviewing plaintiffs' claims individually); Martin v. Telectronics Pacing
Sys., Inc., 105 F.3d 1090, 1098-100 (6th Cir. 1997) (analyzing each of plaintiffs'
common law tort claims for manufacturing defect, design defect, and failure to
warn).
147 Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 500 (1996) (emphasis added).
148 Horn v. Thoratec Corp., 376 F.3d 163, 174 (3d Cir. 2004) (first emphasis
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The Horn court, however, failed to conduct such an
examination. It merely stated that it was "satisfied" that Mrs.
Horn's general state law claims would impose conflicting
substantive requirements. 14 9 The court gave brief examples of
why some of the claims would conflict, 150 but it never separately
examined the nature and effects of each of the claims. 5 1 A more
thorough analysis of the claims would have shown that somealthough not all-should have survived preemption.
Mrs. Horn's claims sounded in both strict liability and
negligence. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has adopted the
strict liability standard of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
section 402A.152 In order to prevail under this standard, Mrs.
Horn needed to show that the device was unsafe for its intended
user. 153 To succeed on her negligence-based claims, she had to
establish that the manufacturer had a duty or obligation to
conform to a certain standard of conduct, failed to conform to
that standard, and caused the injury that resulted in actual
damage or loss. 5 4 Holding Thoratec liable based on these tort
added).
See id. at 176.
150 See id. at 176-77. The court stated that Mrs. Horn's claim that the screw
ring was defectively designed would force the manufacturer to alter the design that
had previously been approved by the FDA and would result in the need for
additional FDA approval. Id. at 176. In addition, it found that Mrs. Horn's failure to
warn claims would require the manufacturer to provide warnings and instructions
different from those approved by the FDA. Id.
151Part V of the Lohr opinion, joined by Justice Breyer, systematically
evaluated all of the plaintiffs claims, discussing the nature of each and its potential
effect on the manufacturer. See Lohr, 518 U.S. at 492-502. The Horn court only
focused on distinguishing the two cases and failed to give adequate deference to the
rule of the Supreme Court for evaluating state requirements. For example, in Lohr,
the Court individually examined the design defect and manufacturing and labeling
claims. See id. at 492-94, 497-502. It determined that, in each circumstance, the
federal requirements were not sufficiently specific to have a preemptive effect. See
id. at 493-94, 501. Although never expressly stated, Lohr's method of carefully
comparing each federal and state requirement should have been considered binding
on lower courts in subsequent cases.
152 See Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., Inc., 391 A.2d 1020, 1024 (Pa. 1978). A
federal court sitting in diversity must employ the substantive law of the forum state.
See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., Inc., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941).
153 See Phillips v. Cricket Lighters, 841 A.2d 1000, 1007 (Pa. 2003).
154 See Macina v. McAdams, 421 A.2d 432, 434 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980) (quoting
WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 143 (4th ed. 1971)). To determine if a
defendant in a negligence action had a duty of care, the Pennsylvania courts balance
the following five factors: "(1) the relationship between the parties; (2) the social
utility of the [defendant's] conduct; (3) the nature of the risk imposed and
foreseeability of the harm incurred; (4) the consequences of imposing a duty upon
149
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theories would not have imposed device-specific requirements on
the HeartMate because Mrs. Horn's claims were general in
nature and not drawn specifically with respect to the
Heartmate.155
A. Defective Design Claim
Mrs. Horn's defective design claims were based in
negligence. Specifically, she claimed negligent failure to test and
study the HeartMate adequately and failure to use proper suture
Simply because her claims mentioned the
material. 156
HeartMate by name did not mean that they were sufficiently
device-specific to impose substantive requirements on the
manufacturer. To be the proper subject of preemption, state
claims must be both developed "with respect to" medical devices
and impose a duty "different from, or in addition to," federal
requirements. 157 Thus, an understanding of what is "different
from, or in addition to," federal standards becomes particularly
important.
It is submitted that the phrase "different from, or in addition
to," should be limited to those state requirements that would

the [defendant]; and (5) the overall public interest in the proposed solution."
Phillips, 841 A.2d at 1008-09 (quoting Althaus v. Cohen, 756 A.2d 1166, 1169 (Pa.

2000)).

155 In addition to defective design and failure to warn, Mrs. Horn also asserted
that Thoratec failed to use good manufacturing practices. Thermo Cardiosystems,
229 F. Supp. 2d at 385. She made no claim, however, that Thoratec ever deviated
from the manufacturing process requirements imposed by the FDA. She claimed
that although the manufacturer followed the precise FDA manufacturing guidelines
for the HeartMate, the device as manufactured was still unsafe. See id. at 390.
Because such a finding would mean that something specific was wrong with the
FDA-approved manufacturing process, her claim would impose requirements
different from, or in addition to, specific federal manufacturing requirements. If
Horn asserted, however, that Thoratec's manufacturing process deviated from the
requirements of the FDA, the claim would not be preempted because it would be
parallel to, rather than opposed to, the federal requirement. See Martin v.
Medtronic, Inc., 254 F.3d 573, 585 (5th Cir. 2001) (stating that claims alleging that
device manufacturer did not comply with the PMA process were not preempted
because they were not "different from, or in addition to," federal requirements).
Here, the heavy burden imposed on the device by the exacting federal
manufacturing requirements increases the likelihood of conflict with the state
standard resulting from a tort award. Therefore, the court correctly held that Mrs.
Horn's manufacturing defect claim was preempted.
156 Horn v. Thermo Cardiosystems, Inc., 229 F. Supp. 2d 381, 385 (M.D. Pa.
2002), aff'd sub nom. Horn v. Thoratec Corp., 376 F.3d 163 (3d Cir. 2004).
157 Lohr, 518 U.S. at 500.
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directly prevent a manufacturer from complying with federal
requirements. 158
In Lohr, Justice Breyer did not share the
plurality's belief that state common law claims are rarely, if ever,
preempted by section 360k. 159 His concurrence is, therefore, the
narrowest holding of the Court on this point, and is controlling.
Nevertheless, even under Justice Breyer's more expansive view
of preemption, Mrs. Horn's defective design claims would survive.
Justice Breyer was not concerned with the safety requirements
imposed by general tort duties; he was troubled with the prospect
of a manufacturer facing two conflicting obligations-one federal
and one state-and the manufacturer's inability to satisfy
both.160 To illustrate his point, Justice Breyer gave the example
of a federal FDA regulation that required a two-inch wire in a
hearing aid and a state regulation requiring a one-inch wire. 16 1
Because both requirements are impossible to satisfy, the state
agency's regulation is preempted. Justice Breyer argued that if
such was the case, a state tort action finding that it was
negligent to use a wire greater than one inch would have the
same substantive effect as the regulation and, as a result, would
also be preempted. 162 Thus, Justice Breyer believed that only
claims
imposing specific conflicting requirements were
preempted and not negligence claims of general applicability,
which do not cause a manufacturer to face opposing design
requirements. 163
Here, Mrs. Horn's negligent design claims simply asserted
that the HeartMate was not safe for its intended use. Her claims
did not allege negligence for failure to adopt a particular
alternative design. 6 4 For example, she did not state what kind of
158 See Vladeck, supra note 19, at 119 (arguing that preemption makes sense
where compliance with both the federal and state requirements would be
implausible, but in the case of tort claims, the manufacturer always retains the
option of doing nothing).
159 Id. at 508 (Breyer, J., concurring).
160 See id. at 507 (writing that preemption occurs if "the state requirement
actually conflicts with the federal requirement... [such that] compliance with both
is impossible").
161 Id. at 504.
162 Id.

163 See Vladeck, supra note 19, at 119.
164 The complaint listed alternatives for the design of the outlet elbow:
Had the screw ring been of an appropriate and feasible design which
would not permit the screw ring to become unscrewed as a result of pump
movement, or had something more durable than a suture been used to
secure the tightened screw ring, or had the threaded sleeve with the eyelet
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suture material should have been used or what component
should have been substituted for the screw ring. A verdict in her
favor would not result in the manufacturer having to choose
between two diametrically opposed requirements and thus would
not fall within the purview of Justice Breyer's conflictingobligations argument. 165 Therefore, Mrs. Horn's defective design
claims should have survived the preemption defense.
B. Warnings Defect Claims
Mrs. Horn's warnings defect claims included failure to
provide adequate warnings that the screw ring could disconnect
and failure to give physicians adequate instructions regarding
implantation. 166 The court determined that these claims would
conflict with the HeartMate's labeling and instructions as
approved by the FDA. 16 7 With very little discussion, it concluded
that Mrs. Horn's failure to warn claims "would require [Thoratec]
to provide different warnings and instructions from those
approved by the FDA."168 Once again, the court failed to evaluate
adequately the specificity of the claims in order to gauge whether
they would really impose conflicting duties on the manufacturer.
A more complete analysis would have revealed that the state
claims do not conflict with the specific federal labeling
requirements.
First, Mrs. Horn's failure to warn claims were not
been placed in such a way that the retaining suture did not run across the
interior portion of the screw ring directly beneath the underside of the
sternum, the disconnection.., would never have occurred.
Horn v. Thermo Cardiosystems, Inc., 229 F. Supp. 2d 381, 384-85 (M.D. Pa. 2002),
affd sub nom. Horn v. Thoratec Corp., 376 F.3d 163 (3d Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).
This list, however, merely illustrated the existence of feasible alternative designs,
and a verdict in her favor would not have required Thoratec to adopt any of these
alternatives.
165It is possible that when faced with the prospect of having to pay additional
tort remedies, the manufacturer would choose to adopt a different design. No specific
change, however, would be mandated by Horn's claims and such an effect would be
an indirect result of the litigation. One court went so far as to hold that even if a
common law recovery imposed an additional obligation on a product manufacturer,
this was permissible because the manufacturer may opt between making changes in
accordance with a tort verdict or paying compensation to future victorious tort
plaintiffs. See Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1540-43 (D.C. Cir.
1984).
166 Thermo Cardiosystems,229 F. Supp. 2d at 385.
167 See Horn v. Thoratec Corp., 376 F.3d 163, 176-77 (3d Cir. 2004) (depicting
state claims and federal law as being in "severe tension").
168 Id. at 176 (citation omitted).
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sufficiently developed "with respect to" the HeartMate in order to
be preempted. She merely asserted that the manufacturer failed
to warn of the risks attendant with use of the device. Similar to
the design defect claim, the complaint does not specifically state
what warnings should have been included in the product's
169
labeling, but only that the warnings supplied were deficient.
Where, as here, failure to warn claims are predicated solely upon
the general duty of every manufacturer to warn consumers of the
risks associated with using a potentially dangerous product, they
fall within the general-applicability exception of the FDA
regulations 170 and are not sufficiently device-specific to be
preempted.171
Furthermore,
FDA regulations
explicitly permit
a
manufacturer to initiate labeling alterations-even before receipt
of an FDA order approving the changes-if they will add or
strengthen
a contraindication,
warning, precaution, or
instruction that is intended to enhance the safe use of the
device. 72 The warnings reviewed and approved by the FDA
could therefore be viewed as the minimum safety requirement,
rather than as the only warnings that the manufacturer may
include. 73 Because encouraging the manufacturer to implement
169 See supra text accompanying notes 164-65.
170 See generally supra text accompanying notes 130-37.
171 Cf. Oja v. Howmedica, Inc., 111 F.3d 782, 789 (10th Cir. 1997) (finding
negligent failure to warn claim at issue not adequately "device-specific"). In Oja,
after the manufacturer filed a PMA application for use of an artificial hip without
adhesive cement, the FDA permitted approval under the section 510(k) process
based on use and approval of the same device requiring cement. See id. at 787. In
considering the original application, the FDA had carefully reviewed the labeling
and warnings of the device, conditioning approval upon deletion of one word from
the proposed labeling. See id. In 1991, the FDA cited the manufacturer for
regulatory violations; as a result, the manufacturer issued a "Dear Doctor" letter,
which the FDA approved, instructing physicians on proper surgical techniques for
device implantation. See id. The court held that the original FDA requirement-that
the device could not be labeled or promoted for use without cement-was sufficient
to establish a specific federal requirement with respect to labeling, even though the
device had received section 510(k) approval. See id. at 789. The court also held that
the injured plaintiffs negligent failure to warn claim did not constitute a state
requirement developed with respect to a particular device, and that the general duty
to warn of foreseeable dangers is "'not the kindo of requiremento that Congress and
the FDA feared would impede the ability of federal regulators to implement and
enforce specific federal requirements.'" Id. (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S.
470, 501 (1995)).
172 21 C.F.R § 814.39(d)(2) (2005).
173 However, in its January 2006 statement regarding prescription drug
labeling, the FDA said that it views its labeling requirements as both a floor and a
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such changes is within the spirit of the MDA's purpose of
enhancing safety, it seems unlikely that the FDA would sanction
a manufacturer if-upon discovering a safety problem with its
device-it unilaterally altered the label to make the warnings

stronger. 174
Moreover, it is for the finder of fact at trial to decide whether
a reasonable manufacturer would have foreseen the potential for
failure of the device and whether Thoratec was negligent for not
warning of possible malfunction. 175 It is therefore possible for a
jury to find that the manufacturer was negligent for failing to
include such additional warnings without such finding conflicting
with the requirements previously established by the FDA. 176 If a
jury does not state specifically what warnings should have been
included, a general finding that Thoratec negligently failed to
give proper instructions for the use and safety of the HeartMate,
despite FDA approval of the labeling, would not impose labeling
requirements in direct conflict with those imposed by the FDA.
Therefore, the court improperly held Mrs. Horn's negligent
failure to warn claims preempted at the early summary
judgment phase of the litigation.
To be sure, Thoratec would likely alter the HeartMate's
labeling in response to an adverse verdict, but subsequent
alteration would not mean that a new labeling requirement has
been established.
Thoratec argued that because it would
ultimately need to obtain supplementary PMA approval for all
label changes, a finding that the approved labeling was
insufficient would impose obligations in direct conflict with the
ceiling, instead of a mere minimum-safety standard. FDA Final Rule, Requirements
on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and Biological
Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3,922, 3,934-35 (Jan. 24, 2006) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R.
pts. 201, 314, 601).
174 See Brooks v. Howmedica, Inc., 273 F.3d 785, 800 (8th Cir. 2001) (Bye, J.,
dissenting) ("Section 814.39(d)(2) is not a moth-eaten relic of past regulatory efforts
to which we attach little or no importance. The provision is a vital component of the
FDA's larger regulatory mission of ensuring that manufacturers amend their
warnings and their products in response to safety concerns and scientific
advancements.").
175 Clearly, if the risk is determined
to have been unforeseeable, the
manufacturer will be relieved of liability for failure to warn. See Palsgraf v. Long
Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 342, 162 N.E. 99, 99 (1928) (holding that no
negligence exists where the risk would have been unforeseeable to the ordinary
vigilant person in the defendant's position).
176 See Oja, 111 F.3d at 789 (writing that general duty to warn of foreseeable
dangers does not compel preemption).
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specific label approval of the FDA. 177 Again, however, the federal
requirement for safety warnings in this case may be viewed as
only a threshold; 17 Thoratec always had the ability to add safety
warnings to the product labeling. 179 "For example, nothing in the
PMA process forbade Thoratec from warning that the heart
pump should not be installed if the sutures would face upward,
toward the patient's sternum."'18 0 Therefore, voluntary inclusion
of additional warnings following an adverse verdict would not
impose safety requirements on Thoratec that did not exist
already.
Although the Third Circuit correctly found some of Mrs.
Horn's claims preempted, it did not give adequate consideration
to the design defect and warnings defect claims. Under Justice
Breyer's narrowest holding in Lohr, a claim is "different from, or
in addition to," the federal requirements if it forces the
manufacturer to choose between directly conflicting obligations.
Here, a jury's general conclusion that the HeartMate was
improperly designed or that the warnings were insufficient would
not dictate exactly how the product should have been designed or
labeled.
Because such claims would not impose directly
conflicting standards on Thoratec, they are not "different from, or
in addition to," the federal requirements, and should therefore
have escaped preemption.
CONCLUSION

The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution
requires that federal law preempt state law where there is a
direct conflict. When the federal law is ambiguous and the state
law at issue is a common law tort claim, however, a presiding
court must examine several variables before it finds preemption.
Congressional intent is of paramount importance, and a court
should look for a clear statement of intent to preempt tort claims.
Where no clear statement exists, a court should look to
legislative history, purpose, and structure of the federal law to
177 See

Horn v. Thoratec Corp., 376 F.3d 163, 177 & n.21 (3d Cir. 2004).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288C (1965) ("Compliance with a
legislative enactment or an administrative regulation does not prevent a finding of
negligence where a reasonable man would take additional precautions.") (emphasis
added).
179 See 21 C.F.R § 814.39(d)(2) (2005). See also supra text accompanying notes
178

172-74.
180

Plaintiff,Device Maker Differ, supra note 142.
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decipher congressional intent. Examining the MDA in this light
suggests that Congress did not intend to preempt state tort
claims but does not provide a definitive answer. Thus, the
regulations implemented by the controlling regulatory agency
should be given substantial weight. Those promulgated by the
FDA state that requirements of general applicability will not be
preempted by the MDA. To determine whether claims will
impose specific or general requirements, a court should compare
each claim to the applicable federal requirement and preempt
only those that are in direct conflict.
In the case of Horn v. Thoratec Corp., the Third Circuit failed
to engage in the proper analysis when it did not address each of
the plaintiffs claims individually. If it had done so, the court
would have found that although some claims were properly
preempted, the general design and warnings defects claims
would not establish requirements for the device in direct conflict
with those of federal law. Therefore, Mrs. Horn's design and
warnings defect claims would not be "different from, or in
addition to," the federal requirements and should have escaped
preemption. Thus, this important decision deserved greater
analysis than that in which the Third Circuit engaged.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

